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What Does the Federal Reserve’s Economic Value Model Tell Us About 





  The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s revealed the vulnerability of some depository 
institutions to changes in interest rates.  Since that episode, U.S. bank supervisors have placed 
more emphasis on monitoring the interest rate risk of commercial banks.  One outcome 
developed by economists at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors was a duration-based 
Economic Value Model (EVM) designed to estimate the interest rate sensitivity of banks. 
  We test whether measures derived from the Fed’s EVM are correlated with the interest 
rate sensitivity of U.S. community banks.  The answer to this question is important because bank 
supervisors rely on EVM measures for monitoring and scoping bank-level interest rate 
sensitivity.   
  We find that the Federal Reserve’s EVM is indeed correlated with banks’ interest rate 
sensitivity and conclude that supervisors can rely on this tool to help assess a bank’s interest rate 
risk.  Our results are consistent with prior research that finds the average interest rate risk at 
banks to be modest, though we do not consider the potential interaction between interest rate risk 
and other risk factors. 
    1
1.  Introduction 
Interest rate risk at commercial banks is the risk that changes in interest rates will 
adversely affect income or capital.  Such risk is an inherent part of banking because banks 
typically originate loans with longer maturities than the deposits they accept.  This maturity 
mismatch between loans and deposits compresses the net interest margin (NIM)—the spread 
between loan rates and deposit rates—when interest rates rise because interest rates on deposits 
adjust more quickly than interest rates on loans.  Further, when interest rates rise, the economic 
value of longer-term instruments (assets) fall by more than the economic value of shorter-term 
instruments (liabilities), reducing the bank’s capital. 
Bankers became increasingly concerned about interest rate risk following the savings and 
loan (S&L) crisis.  In the early 1980s, many thrifts became insolvent following the sharp rise in 
interest rates, setting off a crisis that eventually required a $150 billion taxpayer bailout (Curry 
and Shibut, 2000).  Thrifts were particularly vulnerable to interest rate risk because of the large 
maturity mismatch that resulted from using short-term deposits to fund long-term home loans.  
Nevertheless, banks learned valuable lessons from the S&L experience and devoted considerable 
resources to measuring and managing their interest rate risk exposures.  Many regional and 
money-center banks implemented elaborate models to measure their exposure and began to use 
sophisticated asset and liability management to manage their risk.   
Bank supervisors also were challenged to stay abreast of the industry’s ability to take on 
interest rate risk, and they responded with three related initiatives.  First, bank examiners 
received capital markets training to help them understand better the techniques for measuring 
and managing interest rate risk.  Second, bank supervisors explicitly incorporated interest rate 
risk into their ratings system in 1997, transforming the “CAMEL” rating system into   2
“CAMELS.”
1  The “S” rating stands for a bank’s sensitivity to market risk, which includes 
interest rate risk and exposure to trading account assets, exchange rates, and commodity prices.
2  
The third supervisory initiative was to develop a measure of interest rate risk that could be used 
for off-site surveillance and risk-scoping.  Economists at the Federal Reserve’s Board of 
Governors developed a proprietary economic value of equity model called the Economic Value 
Model (EVM), which is a duration-based estimate of interest rate sensitivity for each U.S. 
commercial bank (Houpt and Embersit, 1991; Wright and Houpt, 1996).  The Federal Reserve 
operationalized the model in the first quarter of 1998 by producing a quarterly report (called the 
Focus report) for each bank.  The Focus reports are the confidential supervisory reports that 
provide the detailed output of the Fed’s EVM. 
The EVM’s interest rate sensitivity assessment is most relevant for community banks, 
which we define as those with less than $1 billion in assets and no interest rate derivatives.  
Larger banks often have derivatives or other balance-sheet complexities that the EVM ignores, 
making the output from the EVM more questionable.  The EVM also is more appropriately 
applied to community banks because community banks are examined less often than larger banks 
and the EVM is usually the only off-site interest rate risk assessment tool available to examiners 
for those banks.  Community banks devote fewer resources to modeling and measuring their 
interest rate risk than do regional and money center banks, which normally have full-time staff 
devoted to such tasks.  Consequently, examiners of larger institutions usually have access to 
more sophisticated and often more timely information than that provided by the EVM.  
                                                 
1 Board of Governors, SR 96-38.  CAMEL stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and 
Liquidity. 
2 For the majority of banks that have no trading accounts or foreign currency exposures, market risk and interest rate 
risk are equivalent.   3
This paper investigates the effectiveness of the EVM by examining whether model 
estimates are correlated with community bank measures of interest rate sensitivity during recent 
periods of both rising and falling interest rates.  Because the model is relatively new, it has yet to 
be validated against actual bank performance.  The Federal Open Market Committee (F.O.M.C.) 
increased the fed funds rate six times in 1999 and 2000 to slow a vibrant economy, and then 
lowered the fed funds rate 12 times in 2001 and 2002.  A strong correlation between the EVM’s 
estimate of interest rate sensitivity and measures of interest rate risk during these periods would 
suggest that the model provides a useful surveillance tool to community bank supervisors. 
We find that estimates from the Fed’s EVM are correlated with the performance of U.S. 
community banks in the manner the EVM suggests.  Specifically, banks that the EVM identifies 
as being the most liability sensitive—the most sensitive to rising rates—show the biggest 
deterioration in performance during the period of interest rate increases between 1998 and 2000.  
The most liability sensitive banks also show the greatest improvement in performance measures 
during the 2000 through 2002 period of falling rates.  The evidence indicates, then, that the EVM 
is a useful tool for supervisors interested in identifying the minority of banks that are highly 
sensitive to interest rate changes. 
2.  Related Literature 
Researchers have examined the interest rate sensitivity of depository institutions in some 
detail.  There are two general lines of inquiry.  The first line of inquiry asks whether depository 
institutions are exposed to interest rates changes and, if so, how large is that exposure on 
average?  The motivation for this research often is to assess the impact that monetary policy or 
unexpected inflation might have on financial intermediation.  Most studies measure interest rate 
sensitivity by regressing the firm’s stock return on a market index and an interest rate.  Flannery   4
and James (1984), Aharony, Saunders and Swary (1986), Saunders and Yourougou (1990), 
Yourougou (1990), and Robinson (1995) find that stock prices react to (unexpected) interest rate 
changes.  A major limitation of this research is that the vast majority of U.S. banks are excluded 
from the analysis because they have no publicly traded equity.  Flannery (1981; 1983) constructs 
a model that estimates the effect of rate changes on a bank’s net operating income.  The model 
has the added advantage that it indirectly estimates the maturities of the assets and liabilities.  
Flannery finds that the impact of rate changes on long-run bank earnings is small, averaging only 
5.6% of net operating earnings.  He also finds that banks are slightly asset sensitive; that is, 
profits increase with interest rates.  These results, however, contradict much of the literature—
including some of Flannery’s later work—which shows that banks tend to be exposed to rising 
rates. 
A second line of inquiry attempts to isolate a bank-specific measure of interest rate risk to 
separate banks by their interest rate sensitivity.  Regulators are interested in this process because 
bank-specific measures provide opportunities to identify high-risk banks.  Flannery and James 
(1984) construct a one-year gap measure and quantify the correlation between this measure and 
the portion of a bank’s stock return driven by interest rate changes.  They find that this simple 
maturity variable has statistically significant explanatory power.  Gilkeson, Hudgins and Ruff 
(1997) use output from a regulatory gap model for thrifts between 1984 and 1988.  They also 
find a statistically significant correlation between net interest income and the one-year gap 
measure.  Robinson and Klemme (1996) find that bank holding companies with relatively high 
levels of mortgage activity have higher degrees of interest rate sensitivity than other bank 
holding companies as reflected by changes in stock prices.  Finally, Lumpkin and O’Brien 
(1997) construct a comprehensive measure of portfolio revaluations at thrifts due to interest rate   5
changes.  They fail to find evidence that such revaluations influence stock returns beyond the 
influence already captured by more general movements in interest rates. 
  This article adds to the evidence that banks are liability sensitive, though the interest 
rate sensitivity, on average, is small.  Our results are consistent with Gilkeson et al (1997) by 
showing that even accounting-based measures of interest rate sensitivity can have significant 
explanatory power to aid bank supervisors in risk-scoping and monitoring the interest rate 
exposure of commercial banks.  Also consistent with previous literature, our results imply that 
large rate increases by monetary policy-makers are unlikely to have significant adverse effects 
on the banking industry. 
3.  A Measure of Rate Sensitivity: The EVM 
Interest rate risk is the product of a bank’s rate sensitivity and subsequent rate changes.  
If rate changes are unpredictable, then measurement of a bank’s rate sensitivity is crucial to 
monitoring and controlling interest rate risk.  Models that measure interest rate sensitivity fall 
into one of two categories.  Earnings at risk models estimate changes in a bank’s net interest 
margin or net income in response to changes in interest rates.  Equity at risk models estimate 
changes in a bank’s market value of equity, or its economic capital,  in response to changes in 
interest rates. 
Federal Reserve economists used the concept of duration to develop an equity at risk 
model of a bank’s interest rate sensitivity.  Duration is the present-value weighted-average time 
to maturity of a financial instrument.
3  Conceptually, it is the price sensitivity of a financial 
instrument to a change in interest rates.  If, for example, the (modified) duration of a T-bond is    
                                                 
3 A number of financial textbooks discuss duration in detail.  See, for example, Financial Institutions Management, 
4
th edition, by Anthony Saunders and Marcia Millon Cornett, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2003.   6
-3.0, the bond is projected to lose 3 percent of its value given a 100 basis-point increase in 
interest rates.  The price of a financial instrument with a larger duration will fluctuate more in 
response to interest rate changes than the price of an instrument with a smaller duration. 
To ease banks’ regulatory burden, the Fed’s EVM uses call report data, most of which is 
recorded at historical cost.  The EVM aggregates balance sheet items into various categories, an 
example of which is shown in Table 1.
4  The model then matches each category with a proxy 
financial instrument—an instrument with a known market price that has a duration similar to 
those items in a given category—and assigns a “risk weight.”  The risk weight for each category 
is the estimated change in economic value of those items given a 200 basis point instantaneous 
rise in rates.
5  For example, the EVM places all fixed-rate mortgage products that reprice or 
mature in more than 5 years into the same category.  As Table 1 illustrates, the risk weight for 
that category is -8.50, indicating that the value of those mortgages are estimated to decline by 8.5 
percent following an immediate 200 basis point rate hike.  The change in economic value is 
repeated for each balance sheet category.  The predicted change in the economic value of equity, 
then, is the difference between the predicted change in assets and the predicted change in 
liabilities.  The net change is scaled either by assets or equity.  In this paper, we scale the change 
in equity by assets and refer to the output of the EVM as the “EVE” score.  The example bank in 
Table 1 has an EVE score of -1.97; that is, the bank is expected to lose equity equal to 1.97 
percent of assets when interest rates rise by 200 basis points. 
The model’s simplicity and generality make it a potentially powerful surveillance tool, 
but those same characteristics lead practitioners to question its usefulness.  First, a precise 
                                                 
4 Table 1 is adapted from Wright and Houpt (1996).  This table does not show the exact categories and risk weights 
used in the EVM. 
5The (confidential) risk weights are derived by economists at the Board, and they do not change over our sample 
period.   7
economic value of equity model would require an exact calculation of the duration for each 
financial instrument, which in turn requires detailed information on the cash flows and 
optionality of those instruments—data that the call reports do not contain.  Due to this 
information limitation, the Fed’s EVM may perform poorly for banks with a significant share of 
assets invested in complex instruments such as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) or 
callable securities because their durations are more difficult to estimate.
6  CMOs, for example, 
may mature much more quickly than anticipated by the EVM should interest rates fall because 
homeowners will exercise their refinancing option.  The maturity of core deposits may be 
another source of error.  A community bank in a rural area with strong ties to its depositors may 
have a duration of demand deposits that is significantly longer than the duration at larger urban 
banks because the rural customers are less likely to withdraw their funds should market rates 
increase.  A second reason to question the applicability of the EVM is that a precise equity-at-
risk calculation requires current market prices on all balance sheet items because the estimated 
change in the value of an asset or liability is equal to the duration multiplied by its price.  Strictly 
speaking, the term “economic value” in this context is a misnomer because the EVM uses book 
values as estimates of market prices.  A third weakness is that the EVM simulates just one 
interest rate scenario.  Specifically, the model projects changes to a bank’s economic value of 
equity given an instantaneous 200 basis-point upward parallel shift in the yield-curve.  The 
model does not account for changes in the slope of the yield curve, nor does it simulate a 
reduction in interest rates. 
Despite these weaknesses, the Fed’s EVM still may serve as a useful measure of interest 
rate sensitivity for community banks.  Even if the actual EVE score of a given bank is imprecise, 
                                                 
6 The EVM also fails to account for derivatives, another class of complex instruments.  We eliminate banks with 
derivatives from our sample to avoid any bias from this source.   8
the ordinal ranking of banks by EVE scores may help supervisors detect the outlier banks that are 
vulnerable to an interest rate shock.     
4.  Measuring the Impact of Rate Changes with Accounting Data 
  Tests of the ability of the EVM to measure interest rate sensitivity require assessments 
of bank performance following interest rate changes.  The ideal performance indicator for testing 
the EVM is the change in the economic value of equity following a change in interest rates.  In 
such a world, the ex-post interest rate sensitivity of a bank could be measured via an econometric 
model by estimating the change in publicly traded equity due to the change in rates.  Indeed, a 
number of studies have estimated the interest rate sensitivity of large banks in this manner. 
Unfortunately, such data are available only for the approximately 300 bank holding 
companies with actively-traded equity.  To assess community bank performance following 
interest rate changes, we must rely exclusively on accounting information produced under 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  Because we are limited to accounting data, 
our methodology simultaneously tests the usefulness of regulatory accounting information and 
the Fed’s EVM.  The adequacy of GAAP-based measures to capture interest rate risk is a 
question we leave for future research. 
The accounting-based bank performance measures we utilize include changes in the net 
interest margin (NIM), return on assets (ROA), and the book value of equity (BVE).  NIM is the 
ratio of net interest income divided by average earning assets, ROA (as defined here) is net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average assets, and BVE is simply the accounting 
value of total equity capital divided by total assets.  The change in BVE is a straightforward, 
albeit imperfect, performance measure to assess the EVM because the EVM directly estimates 
the change in equity given an interest rate change.  Unlike the economic value of equity, book   9
equity will change slowly as items are gradually marked to market (recorded at market prices).  
The usefulness of NIM and ROA require further explanation. 
Although the theoretical link between earnings and a duration-based equity at risk model 
is somewhat loose, an empirical relationship should be discernable over a large number of 
observations.  Banks that the EVM estimates to be exposed to rising interest rates (those with 
large negative EVE scores) are those that have weighted-average asset durations greater than 
weighted-average liability durations.  When interest rates rise, assets decline in value more than 
liabilities, reducing the bank’s economic capital.  Because maturity is one component of 
duration, those same banks should be liability sensitive on average such that liabilities tend to 
mature or reprice faster than assets.  In the short term, interest expense on liabilities will tend to 
increase more quickly than interest income on assets in a rising rate environment, reducing the 
net interest margin.  The change in ROA captures not only the effect on NIM, but also captures 
any other noninterest impact of rate changes on earnings.  Loan origination income might 
decline, for example, when interest rates rise because refinancing activity slows.  We expect, 
therefore, that banks with large negative values of EVE will exhibit a more pronounced 
deterioration in these income measures when interest rates rise, and those same banks will see a 
larger surge in income when interest rates fall. 
A cursory look at bank net interest margins suggests that banks are modestly rate 
sensitive.  Figure 1 plots the effective fed funds rate on the right axis and the four quarter moving 
average NIM on the left axis.  We employ the four quarter moving average to control for the 
seasonality in the data.  Although the effective fed funds rate fluctuated by more than 400 basis   10
points between 1998 and 2002, the average NIM of U.S. commercial banks changed little, 
staying within a range of about twenty basis points.
7   
5.  Empirical Analysis of the Economic Value Model 
We test the ability of the Fed’s EVM to distinguish interest rate sensitivity differences 
among U.S. community banks by comparing the measured interest rate sensitivity of the EVM 
with accounting performance measures.  Observance of a bank’s ex-post experience of interest 
rate risk requires an interest rate change, a degree of rate sensitivity, and a time period 
sufficiently long enough for the interest rate risk to flow through the accounting data.
8   
To control for rate changes and time lags, we split the sample into two periods: a period 
of rising rates and a period of falling rates.  By splitting the sample period into a rising-rate era 
and falling-rate era, we ensure that the banks are hit by rate changes in the same direction as 
opposed to offsetting rate changes.  We chose the fourth quarter of 1998 through the fourth 
quarter of 2000 as the rising rate period, and the fourth quarter of 2000 through the fourth quarter 
of 2002 as the falling rate period.  The quarterly effective fed funds rate increased 161 basis 
points in the first period, and fell 503 basis points during the second period.  Moreover, the yield 
curve steepened considerably in the falling rate period.  The yield spread between the 10-year 
and 6-month Treasuries averaged 27 basis points between year-ends 1998 and 2000, and 235 
basis points between year-ends 2000 and 2002.  Yield spreads on Treasuries more consistent 
with bank asset and liability durations also increased in the later era.  The spread between the 3-
year and 1-year Treasures averaged 27 basis points in the former period and 89 basis points in 
                                                 
7 Clearly, this analysis is suggestive as other factors such as the 2001 recession may have affected NIM. 
8 Results, not presented here, indicate that the Fed’s EVM cannot distinguish effectively between banks with 
different rate sensitivities using quarterly accounting data. This result is likely a combination of the accounting data 
that react with lags and low absolute levels of interest rate risk at most commercial banks.  In tests using stock 
market returns, the Fed’s EVM can distinguish among firms on a quarterly basis (Sierra, 2004).    11
the later period.  Hence, we should expect larger changes in bank performance measures during 
the falling rate era. 
Our bank performance measures include the changes in net interest margin (NIM), return 
on assets (ROA), and the book value of equity (BVE) over the relevant time period.  We 
compute the changes in NIM and ROA using four-quarter averages to control for seasonality.  
For example, the rising interest rate environment begins in the fourth quarter of 1998 and ends in 
the fourth quarter of 2000.  The change in NIM, then, is the trailing four quarters NIM ending the 
fourth quarter 2000 less the trailing four quarters NIM ending the fourth quarter of 1998.  We 
perform ordinary least squares regression analysis, matched pairs, and correlation analysis with 
the ‘S’ rating to test the EVM. 
5.1.  Bank Sample 
   Our bank sample is split into the rising rate era and the falling rate era.  We exclude 
banks with more than $1 billion in assets in any given quarter, de novo banks (those less than 
five years old), and banks that merged during the respective time period.
9  In addition, we 
eliminate the very smallest banks—those with less than $5 million in assets—and banks with 
measures that are extreme outliers because these values fall outside of the realm of reasonable 
values for typical banks.
10    For each era, the sample contains about 6,000 banks and represents 
about 11 percent of all commercial banking assets.  Descriptive statistics for the full regression 
sample appear in Table 2. 
                                                 
9 Excluding banks involved in mergers potentially creates a survivorship bias.  The bias would emerge if banks with 
high interest rate risk are involved in mergers more than banks with low interest rate risk.  We empirically examine 
this bias by comparing the average EVE scores of the merger banks in the quarters before merger with the average 
EVE scores of the sample banks.  We find that the mean EVE scores from the two groups are not significantly 
different from one another, suggesting that survivorship bias is not important. 
10 We remove banks with NIM, ROA, BVE or nonperforming loans greater than the 99.75
th percentile. We also 
remove banks with ROA below the 0.25
th percentile.  Banks with asset growth rates less than or equal to –100 
percent are excluded.  Finally, we exclude banks with a NIM, BVE or nonperforming loan ratio less than zero.   12
As Table 2 reveals, changes in the accounting performance measures—the dependent 
variables—are modest.  Mean NIM decreased 3 basis points in the rising rate era (Panel A), and 
fell again by 15 basis points in the falling rate era (Panel B).  Changes in ROA were smaller, 
with ROA essentially unchanged in both the rising and falling rate eras.  BVE declined by 2 
basis points in the rising rate environment and increased by 22 basis points in the falling rate 
environment. 
Table 2 also lists summary statistics for the independent variables, and EVE is the 
independent variable of primary interest.  We multiply EVE by minus one to make its 
interpretation more intuitive.  Because the Fed’s EVE measure becomes more negative as the 
liability-sensitivity of the bank increases, EVE and exposure to rising interest rates are inversely 
related.  Flipping the sign on the EVE measure allows us to associate larger EVE values with 
greater exposure to rising interest rates.  The mean EVE in Panel A of Table 2 is 0.87, which 
says that the average bank is predicted to lose 0.87 percent of its net economic asset value given 
a 200 basis point parallel shift in the yield curve.  The mean EVE in the falling rate era is 0.99 
percent.  The average sample bank, therefore, is estimated to be liability sensitive.  
 
5.2.  The Regression Model 
We use regression analysis to assess the average correlation between a bank’s EVE and a 
change in NIM, net income, and book value of equity, for a given change in interest rates.  EVE 
is computed as the average of each quarterly EVE value within the given time period.  We use 
the average EVE value rather than the beginning-of-period EVE value because we are more 
interested in the correlation of EVE with the dependent variables, and less interested in the   13
predictive power of EVE in a given quarter.
11  The average EVE score accounts for changes in 
EVE during the two-year sample period, an important factor if bank managers endogenously 
alter their interest rate sensitivity as interest rates begin to move in a particular direction.  The 
EVE coefficient should be negative in the rising rate era because rising rates reduce earnings and 
equity at liability sensitive banks.  Conversely, the EVE coefficient should be positive in the 
falling rate environment. 
In the regressions, we attempt to control for factors other than interest rate changes that 
could influence income and equity ratios.  Specifically, we include the ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total assets (NPL)—loans that are 90 days or more past due or are no longer accruing 
interest—as a credit risk control variable because nonperforming loans can directly and 
indirectly impact all three dependent variables.  Most nonperforming loans do not accrue 
interest, which means that interest income, and hence NIM and ROA, are lower than they 
otherwise would be.  In addition, higher nonperforming loans may be associated with changes in 
asset quality, which would cause a bank to set aside more provisions and lower ROA.  Finally, 
the change in book value of equity is smaller if net income and, hence, retained earnings are 
smaller.  We expect the signs of the nonperforming loans coefficients to be negative in both the 
rising and falling rate periods.  The mean nonperforming loan to total asset ratio is 0.56 percent 
in Panel A of Table 2 and 0.66 percent in Panel B of Table 2. 
We also control for bank size by including the natural log of total assets (LNTA) in the 
regression.  Net interest margin, net income and book value of equity may respond to the 
economic environment differently at larger banks than at smaller banks.  For example, changes 
                                                 
11 As a robustness check, we ran the regressions using beginning-of-period EVE and obtained qualitatively similar 
results.   14
in interest rates may trigger the use of lines of credit, which are more prevalent at larger 
institutions.  The sign of this coefficient could be positive or negative. 
Asset growth (AGR) is an explanatory variable that controls for portfolio turnover.  More 
rapid asset growth brings assets and liabilities onto the books faster at market prices, which may 
either exacerbate or dampen the sensitivity of earnings and book value equity to changes in 
interest rates.  Asset growth will exacerbate interest rate sensitivity if the new assets and 
liabilities reinforce or increase the bank’s interest rate position.  Conversely, asset growth will 
dampen sensitivity if the new assets and liabilities mitigate the bank’s interest rate position.  The 
average EVE score will partially capture these asset-growth effects, but the EVE scores are not 
asset-weighted.  The signs of the asset growth coefficients, therefore, are uncertain.  Table 2 
shows that banks grew quickly during the two sample periods.  The mean growth rate in the 
rising rate era is 11.35 percent; asset growth in the falling rate era is 12.64 percent.  The standard 
deviation of asset growth is also quite large, exceeding 11 percent in both rate eras. 
We use ordinary least squares to run cross-sectional regressions on the following model: 
i i i i i i AGR LNTA NPL EVE Y ε α α α α α + + + + + = ∆ 4 3 2 1 0            (1) 
where ∆Yi represents the change in the dependent variable (NIM, ROA, or BVE) of bank i.  The 
dependent variables are computed as the end-of-period value less the beginning-of-period value, 
while the independent variables (except asset growth) are the quarterly averages over the time 
period.  Asset growth is simply the percentage change in assets over the period.  We report two 
specifications of Equation (1).  Model 1 excludes asset growth while Model 2 includes asset 
growth.  For both models, the primary focus is on the EVE coefficient.   15
5.3.  Regression Results 
Regression results in Table 3 show that the Fed’s EVM is indeed correlated with the 
accounting performance measures.  In the rising rate era, we expect the high-EVE banks to 
perform worse than low-EVE banks.  Specifically, the EVE coefficient should be negative for 
each regression presented in panel A of Table 3.  Across the columns of the EVE row in panel A, 
the EVE coefficients are negative and statistically significant for every specification and every 
dependent variable.  The results from model 2 indicate that a bank with an EVE score one 
percentage point higher than another bank would experience, all else equal, a drop in NIM, 
ROA, and BVE equal to 5.0, 5.4, and 18.5 basis points, respectively, over the two-year period.  
Put another way, the results imply that for the average bank, which has an EVE score of 0.87, 
NIM, ROA and BVE were about 4.4 (5.0 x 0.87), 4.7 and 16.1 basis points lower, respectively, 
than they would have been had the bank had an EVE score of zero.  The results in panel A are 
consistent with the ability of the Fed’s EVM to identify bank sensitivity to rising rates.  
 In the falling rate era, high-EVE banks are projected to be more liability sensitive such 
that the high-EVE banks should perform better than low-EVE banks.  If EVE is able to 
distinguish effectively between higher and lower liability sensitivity banks, the EVE coefficients 
should be positive in panel B of Table 3.  Across the columns of the EVE row in panel B, the 
EVE coefficients are positive and statistically significant for both model specifications and each 
dependent variable.  The EVE coefficients imply that changes in NIM, ROA and BVE over the 
two-year period are expected to increase 15.2, 8.6 and 3.7 basis points, respectively, for each one 
unit increase in EVE.  The results in panel B are consistent with the ability of the Fed’s EVM to 
identify banks that are the most sensitive to falling interest rates.   16
The EVE coefficients for NIM and ROA are much larger in panel B of Table 3 than in 
panel A, a result that most likely reflects the greater interest rate changes in the falling rate era.  
Recall that the fed funds rate fell 503 basis points in the falling rate era, which is 4.3 times the 
116 basis point rise in the rising rate era.  In addition, the average yield spread between the 1- 
and 3-year Treasuries increased 3.5 times relative to the rising rate era.  According to model 2, a 
bank with an EVE score one percentage point higher than another bank in the rising rate era 
(panel A) experiences a 5.0 basis point drop in NIM. However, in the falling rate era (panel B) a 
bank with an EVE score one percentage point higher than another bank experiences a NIM 
increase of 15.5 basis point increase, 3.1 times the change in rising rate era.  Moreover, ROA in 
the falling rate era increased by 1.6 times (8.6 divided by 5.4) the change in the rising rate era.  
The BVE results, however, do not show the same pattern in magnitude between panels A and B.  
The EVE coefficient for the BVE in the falling rate era changed by just 0.2 times the change in 
the rising rate era. 
With a few exceptions, the coefficients on the control variables have the expected signs.  
Nonperforming loan coefficients are negative in 10 of 12 regressions, and statistically significant 
at the five-percent level or lower in nine regressions.  The coefficients on bank size (LNTA) 
suggest that, all else equal, larger banks have amplified swings in income and equity relative to 
smaller banks.  With three exceptions, the coefficients on LNTA are negative in the rising rate 
era and positive in the falling rate era, implying that NIM, ROA and BVE at the larger banks 
move in the same direction as the interest rate risk.  Finally, the coefficients on asset growth are 
negative and statistically significant in the rising rate era, but remain negative in the falling rate 
era for all the specifications except that with ROA as the dependent variable.  These results   17
suggest that asset growth increased interest rate sensitivity in the rising rate era but partially 
offset the interest rate sensitivity in the falling rate era. 
 
5.4.  Matched Pair Analysis 
Although regression analysis describes the average relationship between EVE and 
accounting performance measures, we are also interested in the ordinal properties of the EVM.  
Can the EVM separate the riskiest banks from the safer ones?  This question is important to 
Federal Reserve examiners and supervisors because they use the model to help assess interest 
rate risk at a large number of community banks.  The model may help them detect banks in the 
riskiest tail of the distribution.   
We begin the matched–pairs analysis by separating the same sample of community banks 
used in the regression analysis into deciles based on their predicted exposure to rising interest 
rates as measured by their average EVE score.  We then compare changes in the performance 
measures across deciles.  By grouping the banks into deciles, we are asking whether the EVM 
broadly ranks banks by interest rate risk, allowing for the possibility that the ordinal rankings 
within a given decile may not be very tight.  Banks that are the most liability sensitive are in the 
top deciles while banks with low liability sensitivity or those that are asset sensitive (exposed to 
falling rates) are in the lowest deciles. This ranking does not imply that banks in the low deciles 
have low interest rate risk because such banks may be extremely asset sensitive.  Interest rate 
risk is best captured by the absolute value of the EVE measure. 
We compare bank performance in the top decile (the most liability sensitive banks) with 
banks in consecutively lower deciles.  Each bank in the top decile is matched with banks in lower 
deciles based on two characteristics.  Total assets at the match bank must be within 50 percent of   18
the sample bank to control for the influence of size on performance ratios, and the 
nonperforming loan to total asset ratios must be within 12.5 basis points to ensure that 
differences in nonaccuring loans do not unduly account for the banks’ differences in net interest 
margins and return on assets.  If several banks qualify as matches with a bank in the top decile, 
we average the performance ratios of the match banks. 
To visualize the different reactions to falling interest rates, we plot in Figure 2 the 
average change in NIM by quarter of the banks in the top decile and the average change in NIM 
of the banks in the bottom decile.  The average NIM at the most liability sensitive banks declines 
during the first three quarters—probably due to the lag from the rising interest rate environment 
in 2000—and then begins to climb in the third quarter of 2001.  In contrast, the average NIM at 
the least liability sensitive banks declines continuously between the fourth quarter of 2000 and 
the fourth quarter of 2002.  By the fourth quarter of 2002, the difference in the change in NIM 
between the top decile and the bottom decile is about 78 basis points.  Most of that difference is 
due to falling NIMs at the least liability sensitive banks; rising NIMs at the most liability 
sensitive banks account for only about 10 basis points of the total difference. 
In addition to Figure 2, we conduct a series of T-tests on the differences in means 
between the most liability sensitive banks and progressively less liability sensitive match-banks, 
for both the rising interest rate environment and the falling rate environment.  The results appear 
in Table 4.  Panel A lists the results for the rising rate era while Panel B lists the results for the 
falling rate era.  The first row of each panel compares the average changes in NIM, ROA and 
book value of equity of banks in the top (tenth) decile with the average changes for banks in the 
ninth decile; the second row compares the top decile with the eighth decile, and so on.  We 
expect the differences to widen as the deciles in the comparison widen.   19
With some notable exceptions, the matched pair results indicate that the Fed’s EVM 
detects relatively fine quantitative differences in interest rate risk across deciles.  The distinctions 
are the most pronounced for NIM and ROA in the falling rate environment, reported in Panel B 
of Table 4.  We expect the differences in changes in NIM and ROA to widen (become more 
positive) as the deciles compared become more extreme because banks that are less liability 
sensitive will respond less favorably to a drop in rates compared with more liability sensitive 
banks.  Indeed, the spread does widen as the gaps between the deciles widen, and the differences 
in the changes are statistically different from zero at the five percent level or lower for every 
comparison.  Differences in the changes of BVE are less robust.  In fact, differences in BVE 
changes have the wrong signs in five of nine comparisons of panel B.  Only for three of the 
comparisons in panel B are the results statistically significant and have the expected sign. 
The matched−pair results for NIM and ROA in the rising rate era are not as dramatic as 
the results in the falling rate era, but the results for the BVE are much stronger than those of the 
falling rate era.  The rising rate era results appear in Panel A of Table 4.  We expect the 
differences in the changes in NIM, ROA and BVE to become more negative as the decile 
comparisons widen because the most liability sensitive banks in the top decile should have larger 
declines in these performance measures relative to less liability sensitive banks.  All of the 
differences of the changes in NIM, ROA and BVE have the expected signs, and they generally 
become more negative as the decile differences widen.  In addition, most are statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  Results for the book value of equity show that banks in the 
top decile experienced a drop in equity of 43.55 basis points while banks in the ninth decile had a 
drop in equity of 8.59 basis points.  The –34.96 basis point difference is statistically significant at 
the one percent level.  The differences in the changes of book value of equity generally become   20
more negative, as expected, such that the spread between the top and bottom deciles is more than 
–79 basis points. 
In sum, matched−pair analysis indicates that the Fed’s EVM can detect differences in 
interest rate risk when banks are grouped by deciles according to their exposure to rising interest 
rates.  These results confirm the robustness of the regression results and suggest that bank 
supervisors can use the EVM as a useful tool to rank community banks by interest rate 
sensitivity. 
5.5.  Correlation with the ‘S’ Rating  
Each time a bank is examined, examiners assign the bank a Sensitivity (S) rating from 1 
to 5, with 1 being the best rating.  A strong and positive correlation between the EVE score and 
the S rating would be consistent with the assertion that the EVM captures information about a 
bank’s interest rate risk.  This analysis also serves as a robustness check against the prior tests, 
which rely solely on accounting numbers. 
We assess the correlation between EVE and S ratings both in decile groupings and on a 
bank-by-bank basis.  As with matched pairs, the decile analysis allows for the possibility that the 
EVE rankings within a given decile may not be very tight.  We rank all the community banks in 
our sample by their EVE scores, and split the banks into deciles.  We then compute the mean 
EVE and S-ratings and rank the deciles by the absolute value of each decile.  If the EVE model is 
calibrated such that banks with the lowest interest rate risk have EVE scores near zero, then 
banks with large absolute-value EVE scores should have relatively worse (higher) examiner 
ratings.  The top half of Table 5 lists the mean EVE score and the mean S rating for each decile, 
listed in descending order by the absolute value of the mean EVE score.   21
The correlation coefficients listed in the bottom half of Table 5 show a consistent positive 
relationship between the absolute value of EVE scores and S ratings.  The correlation coefficient 
on a decile basis is 0.99, and it is 0.14 on a bank-by-bank basis.  Both are statistically different 
from zero at the one percent level.  The high degree of correlation suggests that either the EVM 
captures information about interest rate risk that examiners confirm on site, or the examiners use 
the EVM to help assess interest rate risk.  
Even though Federal Reserve examiners are instructed not to incorporate directly the 
EVM into the “S” rating, one may be skeptical.  One simple test to help discern the direction of 
causation between EVE and S ratings is to examine the correlation between EVE scores and S 
ratings in 1998. Because 1998 was the first year that the Focus reports were made available to 
examiners, a period of transition undoubtedly took place for the examiners to learn about and 
understand the report.  A positive correlation in 1998 would add to the evidence that the EVM 
captures information that examiners confirm on site.  At the bottom of Table 5 we report the 
correlation coefficient between EVE scores and S ratings assigned in 1998.  The decile 
correlation is 0.82 and the bank-level correlation is 0.10.  Again, both are statistically different 
from zero at the one percent level.  The results for 1998 lend support to the hypothesis that the 
EVM contains information about interest rate sensitivity that examiners affirm when they are on 
site at a particular bank. 
6.  Conclusion 
Regression analysis, matched pairs, and correlation analysis demonstrate that the Fed’s 
EVM is a useful supervisory tool to assess the relative interest rate risk at community banks.  
Bank supervisors can confidently use the model’s output to rank banks by interest rate 
sensitivity.  The model appears to be quite stable and robust.  Although the EVM was   22
constructed assuming a parallel yield curve shift upward of 200 basis points, our results 
demonstrate that the model is useful in both rising and falling interest rate eras and in time 
periods in which the slope of the yield curve changes. 
Another conclusion that emerges from these results is that the average interest rate risk at 
community banks appears to be modest.  Even relatively big changes in interest rates such as the 
drop that occurred between December 2000 and December 2002 had relatively small effects on 
income and capital at community banks, both in absolute and relative terms.  For example, 
regression analysis predicts that the average bank with an EVE score of 0.99 experienced an 
increase in net interest margin of about 15 basis points, an increase in return on assets of 9 basis 
points, and an increase in the book value of equity of 4 basis points over the two-year period of 
falling rates.  Although nontrivial, none of these changes by themselves are of sufficient 
magnitude to affect bank performance significantly.  Consequently, interest rate risk does not 
appear to be a significant threat to bank safety and soundness at the present time, a conclusion 
that should provide some comfort to monetary policy makers when they increase interest rates. 
One caveat to this conclusion is that our analysis fails to consider the interaction between 
interest rate risk and other risks, such as credit risk.  A large change in the level of interest rates 
may affect community banks more severely than our analysis suggests because the default rates 
of  marginal borrowers with variable rate payments may increase.   23
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Risk 




(1) (2) (1) x (2)
Fixed rate mortgage products
     0-3 months 0 -0.20 0
     3-12 months 0 -0.70 0
     1-5 years 0 -3.90 0
     More than 5 years 233,541 -8.50 -19,851
Adjustable rate mortagage products 2,932 -4.40 -129
Other amortizing loans and securities
     0-3 months 0 -0.20 0
     3-12 months 0 -0.70 0
     1-5 years 28,858 -2.90 -837
     More than 5 years 0 -11.10 0
Nonamortizing assets
     0-3 months 132,438 -0.25 -331
     3-12 months 7,319 -1.20 -88
     1-5 years 182,373 -5.10 -9,301
     More than 5 years 11,194 -15.90 -1,780
Total interest-sensitive assets 598,655 -32,317




     0-3 months 56,082 0.25 140
     3-12 months 39,634 1.20 476
     1-5 years 157,785 3.70 5,838
     3-5 years 50,600 7.00 3,542
     5-10 years 28,167 12.00 3,380
CDs and other borrowings
     0-3 months 117,491 0.25 294
     3-12 months 77,303 1.20 928
     1-5 years 78,140 5.40 4,220
     More than 5 years 0 12.00 0




Change in assets values -32,317
Change in liability values 18,817
Net change in economic value -13,500
     Change in economic value as a percent of total assets -1.97
Source:  Adapted from Wright and Houpt (1996).
Table 1. How does an accounting-based duration model work?





NPL = Average nonperforming loans to total assets in the given era.
LNTA = The natural log of average total assets in the given era.
AGR = The growth rate of total assets during the given era.
Panel A: Rising Interest Rate ERA, Q4 1998 thru Q4 2000 (6,016 Observations)
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Max
Net Interest 
Margin 4.20 0.73 0.00 3.73 4.14 4.60 8.57
Return on Assets 1.19 0.58 -3.15 0.90 1.17 1.46 5.94
Book Value of 
Equity 10.36 3.46 3.06 8.09 9.55 11.70 51.36
Change in NIM -0.03 0.47 -4.81 -0.24 -0.03 0.19 4.69
Change in ROA -0.01 0.51 -4.94 -0.20 -0.01 0.18 5.19
Change in BVE -0.02 1.59 -20.38 -0.66 0.01 0.67 21.49
EVE 0.87 1.24 -3.26 0.03 0.78 1.57 8.85
NPL 0.56 0.67 0.00 0.11 0.34 0.76 6.06
LNTA 11.22 0.94 8.59 10.56 11.20 11.85 13.81
AGR 11.35 12.32 -92.49 3.97 10.09 17.66 86.07
The trailing four quarters NIM at the end of the period less the trailing four 
quarters NIM at the start of the period.





BVE at the end of the period less BVE at the start of the period.
The trailing four quarters ROA at the end of the period less the trailing four 
quarters ROA at the start of the period.
Change in 
Net Interest Margin
Change in Return on Average 
Assets
26Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Max
Net Interest 
Margin 4.18 0.77 0.24 3.69 4.11 4.60 8.74
Return on Assets 1.20 0.62 -3.25 0.86 1.17 1.50 7.86
Book Value of 
Equity 10.38 3.52 4.51 8.02 9.44 11.77 51.24
Change in NIM -0.15 0.63 -5.98 -0.45 -0.10 0.21 4.42
Change in ROA -0.02 0.58 -5.63 -0.25 0.00 0.25 5.64
Change in BVE 0.22 1.54 -16.56 -0.44 0.27 0.97 10.59
EVE 0.99 1.25 -3.54 0.15 0.86 1.70 10.10
NPL 0.66 0.77 0.00 0.13 0.41 0.91 6.41
LNTA 11.34 0.95 8.67 10.69 11.32 12.00 13.80
AGR 12.64 11.92 -86.17 5.78 11.67 18.71 78.62
Panel B: Falling Interest Rate ERA, Q4 2000 thru Q4 2002 (5,773 Observations)
Table 2 (Continued). Descriptive statistics of regression samples 
27Panel A: Rising Interest Rate ERA, Q4 1998 thru Q4 2000
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.656 0.421 0.230 0.098 1.051 -0.344
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000)
EVE -0.044 -0.050 -0.051 -0.054 -0.149 -0.185
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NPL -0.018 -0.028 -0.111 -0.116 0.021 -0.034
(p-value) (0.017) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.001)
LNTA -0.057 -0.026 -0.012 0.005 -0.084 0.095
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.472) (0.000) (0.000)
AGR -0.008 -0.005 -0.049
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adj. R-Squared 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.15
Obs. 6016 6016 6016 6016 6016 6016
Change in NIM Change in ROA Change in BVE
Table 3. Regression analysis of Fed's Economic Value Model
We divide the sample period into two eras. The first era is from the fourth quarter of 1998
through the fourth quarter of 2000 and is a time period during which interest rates were more-
or-less uniformly increasing. The second era is from the fourth quarter of 2000 through the
fourth quarter of 2002 and is a time period during which interest rates were more-or-less
uniformly falling. Banks that the Fed's model predicts are more liability sensitive should
perform worse over the rising rate era, and the EVE coefficients in panel A should be
negative, which they are. Banks that the Fed's model predicts are more liability sensitive
should perform better over the decreasing rate era, and the EVE coefficients in panel B
should be positive, which they are.  P-values are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
We regress three different measures of ex-post interest rate sensitivity on the Fed's ex-ante 
measure of interest rate sensitivity (EVE), nonperfoming loans (NPL), log of total assets 
(LNTA) and asset growth rate (AGR).  The three dependent variables are change in net 
interest margin, change in return on assets, and change in book value of equity.  The 
coefficient on the EVE variable is the focus of the regression analysis.
Dependent Variable
i i i i i i AGR LNTA NPL EVE Y ε α α α α α + + + + + = ∆ 4 3 2 1 0
28Panel B: Falling Interest Rate ERA, Q4 2000 thru Q4 2002
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept -0.285 -0.467 -0.311 -0.303 -0.488 -1.773
(p-value) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
EVE 0.155 0.152 0.086 0.086 0.058 0.037
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NPL -0.013 -0.028 -0.116 -0.115 0.029 -0.071
(p-value) (0.266) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
LNTA -0.001 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.056 0.235
(p-value) (0.945) (0.012) (0.006) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
AGR -0.007 0.000 -0.052
(p-value) (0.000) (0.770) (0.000)
Adj. R-Squared 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.15
Obs. 5773 5773 5773 5773 5773 5773
Table 3 (Continued). Regression analysis of Fed's Economic Value Model
Change in NIM Change in ROA Change in BVE
Dependent Variable








10 -11.18 -8.08 -43.55
9 -9.60 -6.30 -8.59
10 -11.30 -8.29 -45.18
8 -8.58 -3.37 -16.41
10 -10.92 -8.13 -44.81
7 -5.05 -3.11 -5.99
10 -11.04 -8.48 -45.75
6 -6.57 1.28 -0.87
10 -10.98 -8.25 -44.78
5 -3.70 0.46 -2.41
10 -10.85 -7.76 -44.40
4 -4.08 -1.34 2.40
10 -11.16 -8.44 -43.69
3 6.46 4.57 7.56
10 -11.05 -7.89 -42.86
2 1.32 4.43 8.24
10 -10.97 -8.79 -43.49
1 12.72 14.78 35.80
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 0.10,  0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
595 -1.58

























Table 4. Relative Interest Rate Sensitivity of Pairs Matched by Extremity of the Fed’s 
EVE Model Interest Rate Sensitivity Prediction.
In this table, we divide community banks into deciles based upon their degree of liability sensitivity.
We then match banks in the top decile with similar banks in the lower decile. With few exceptions,
we find that the more liability sensitive banks perform more poorly in the rising rate era, but they
perform better in the falling rate era. These results show that the Fed's EVM accurately separates
banks by their interest rate sensitivity. The banks in the higher (lower) deciles are predicted to be the




































10 9.72 14.33 25.34
9 4.02 8.50 32.68
10 9.93 14.74 25.22
8 -1.21 7.14 26.26
10 9.84 14.71 24.90
7 -5.19 3.39 29.03
10 10.09 14.92 25.31
6 -6.65 4.93 32.65
10 9.78 14.53 25.00
5 -8.37 1.25 20.16
10 9.67 14.37 24.99
4 -19.17 1.25 23.90
10 9.93 14.55 25.09
3 -16.66 -0.46 15.14
10 9.34 14.26 24.69
2 -33.81 -9.38 10.06
10 10.19 14.45 25.18
1 -65.79 -28.76 -2.56
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 0.10,  0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 4(Continued). Relative Interest Rate Sensitivity of Pairs Matched by Extremity 
of the Fed’s EVE Model Interest Rate Sensitivity Prediction.
569 11.14 *** 7.59 *** -1.04
571 -7.34
570 15.03 *** 11.32 *** -4.12
567 16.75 *** 9.99 *** -7.33








5.70 ** 5.82 ***
572 28.85 *** 13.11 *** 1.09
569 26.59 *** 15.01 *** 9.95
***
572 43.15 *** 23.64
Values are in basis points. 
*** 14.63 *
571 75.98 *** 43.21 *** 27.74
3110 1.83 3.44 3,716
9 1.73 2.22 3,715
8 1.67 1.68 3,715
7 1.64 1.28 3,715
6 1.62 -1.12 3,715
5 1.61 0.95 3,715
4 1.56 0.64 3,715
3 1.58 -0.37 3,715
2 1.56 0.34 3,715












***Significant at the 0.01 level or better.
Table 5. The Relationship between the EVM and the "S" Rating              
We measure the correlation between the absolute value of the EVE measure and a bank's "S" rating.
The EVE measure and "S" ratings are positively correlated at a decile and bank level. The results
show that either the Fed's EVM identifies interest rate risk patterns that examiners confirm on site or








     Bank Level
Correlation Coefficient of Absolute Value 
of EVE and "S" Rating 
3233
Figure 1. Net interest margin and 
the effective fed funds rate.























































Trailing four quarters net interest 
margin  (left axis)
Falling rate era Rising rate era
Note: We plot the trailing four quarters net interest margin (NIM) for banks with less than $1 billion in total
assets and the effective quarterly fed funds rate. The movement in NIM is consistent with commercial banks
being modestly rate sensitive on average.34
Figure 2. Changes at net interest margin at EVE predicted high and 





















































Change in net interest margin at EVE-predicted 
HIGH liability sensitive banks (left axis)
Note: We plot the average change in net interest margin (NIM) for high-EVE and low-EVE banks
for the falling rate time period. The figure shows that high-EVE banks are indeed more liability
sensitive than low-EVE banks. Furthermore, the direction of change is consistent with the
Economic Value Model predictions; high-EVE bank NIMs improve while low-EVE bank NIMs
decrease.  The chart also plots the effective fed funds rate on the right axis.  
Change in net interest margin at EVE-
predicted LOW liability sensitive banks 
(left axis)